ANALYSIS - Changing balances in Syria, Sochi Summit

By Assoc. Prof. Emre Ersen

- The writer is a lecturer at Marmara University's Political Science and International Relations Department. He is an expert on Russian foreign policy, Turkey-Russia relations, and Eurasian geopolitics.

ISTANBUL (AA) - Since its direct intervention in Syria about two years ago, Russia has succeeded in significantly changing the balance on the ground and, with Iranian support, helped the Assad regime recapture a significant portion of the territory that it had lost to Daesh and the Syrian opposition forces.

The PYD/YPG threat [the Syrian offshoot of the terrorist PKK] steadily gaining strength under U.S. protection in the north of the country, on the other hand, became instrumental in Turkey's getting closer to the Russian-Iranian axis with regards to Syria.

The cooperation between Ankara, Moscow, and Tehran, which began to strengthen as of late 2016, embarked on a new phase with the launch of the Astana process, where the U.S. is not an active player.

Seven meetings have been held to date in the Astana process and four de-escalation zones have been established in Syria, with Turkey, Russia, and Iran being the cease-fire guarantors. The Astana process has also succeeded in facilitating the defeat of Daesh throughout Syria.

Recently, the diplomatic traffic between Ankara, Moscow and Tehran has visibly gained momentum. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Tehran on Nov. 1 and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and then on Nov. 13, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Putin in Sochi.

At a brief press conference following their meeting, Putin and Erdogan limited themselves to assessing the general state of Turkish-Russian relations. However, the fact that the bilateral meetings and the talks between delegations lasted for more than four hours in total suggests the complicated nature of the problems that still persist between the two countries.

Given the current point arrived at in the Syrian conflict, we see that all the actors involved are seeking answers to the question of how the country's future will be shaped in a post-Daesh era. And this is the primary context in which the Turkey-Russia-Iran summit, to be held on Nov. 22, should be evaluated.

What makes this upcoming summit particularly relevant is that the three leaders will be coming together with an exclusive focus on Syria for the first time since the commencement of the Astana process.

- Russia's different Syrian agenda

The choice of Sochi as the summit's venue demonstrates the importance of the role that Russia has assumed regarding Syria. At a time when the U.S. has recently been increasing its efforts to weigh in on Syria, particularly over Raqqah and Deir al-Zour and through its military collaboration with the PYD/YPG, it is not surprising to see the Putin administration trying to utilize its strong diplomatic leverage.

We should remember at this point that the fact that no official meeting took place between U.S. President Donald Trump and President Putin, despite expectations otherwise, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit recently held in Vietnam caused disappointment in Moscow.

It is therefore possible to interpret in this very context the most recent Russian veto on a U.S.-proposed UN Security Council draft resolution for a probe into the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

However, one should evaluate the dynamics of conflict and cooperation together in the case of Russia-U.S. relations. For example, it was noteworthy that the two leaders had a short meeting at the same APEC summit, where they reached a compromise on a political settlement in Syria and on promoting the Geneva peace process.

It is in this very context that we should evaluate the agreement that Russia, the U.S. and Jordan have recently reached for the establishment of a de-escalation zone in the southwestern part of Syria.

Another important detail is that, in regards to Syria, Moscow has been taking care to stay in dialogue with the actors other than Washington. It is known that Israel is particularly troubled by the recently growing influence of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria and the overall region and has tried to secure a number of guarantees from Russia.

As a matter of fact, this issue marked the agenda of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu's visit to Israel a few weeks ago. On the other hand, King Salman's visit to Russia last month and historic meeting with Putin as well as reports that the Saudis wanted to purchase the Russian S-400 missile defense system symbolize a change in Moscow-Riyadh relations.

- Approach of Iran and Turkey

These steps being taken by Russia in foreign policy are undoubtedly closely followed by Iran and Turkey. It is, in this regard, quite remarkable that President Erdogan criticized Putin and Trump's statements after the APEC summit, in which they both laid emphasis on a political settlement and the Geneva process.

Tehran, meanwhile, is trying to make sense of the bargains discussed especially during the bilateral talks that the Putin administration had with Tel Aviv and Washington, respectively.

Nevertheless, it is currently a major Iranian goal to keep strong strategic ties with Moscow at a time when it feels that it is being contained by the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia in the region. We may say that Russia and Iran's being in the same camp since the very beginning of the Syrian conflict is also a factor facilitating Iranian efforts to this end.

It should be additionally emphasized that the two countries' long-term designs regarding Syria and the future of the region are not exactly the same. For example, while Assad's remaining in power is almost a precondition for Iran for the resolution of the Syrian conflict, Russia is hinting that this issue is open to negotiation.

Moscow's insistence on a secular structure for the new regime in Syria is another cause of disagreement between Moscow and Tehran. Under these circumstances, for Moscow, cooperation with Ankara is of great importance in order to keep Tehran's regional aspirations in check.

It is important to remember that the steps taken by Turkey and Russia to resolve the Aleppo crisis in Dec. 2016 unsettled Iran at the time. It is possible to consider the Astana process an important instrument that Russia came up with in order to maintain the delicate balance between Turkey and Iran with regards to Syria.

The recently strengthening relations between Ankara and Tehran is also of great importance in order to sustain the Astana process in a stable manner. It is significant that, having sought to resolve their disputes over Syria through dialogue, the two countries have acted together in the face of a number of recent regional crises, such as the independence referendum held by the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the sanctions imposed on Qatar by a group of countries under the leadership of Saudi Arabia.

-Idlib, Afrin and PYD/YPG

The most concrete result of the Astana process to date is the establishment of four de-escalation zones in Syria. Especially, the experience from the de-escalation zone in Idlib, which is considered the bastion of the Syrian opposition after Aleppo fell to the regime forces, is very important for the future of the Astana movement.

We may say that Russia and Iran need Turkey in this regard to be able to make a distinction between the moderate opposition groups in Idlib and the Al-Nusra and Daesh-affiliated groups.

Ankara expects that the cooperation with Moscow and Tehran, which began in Idlib, will be extended to include Afrin. It is known that Turkey has kept the option of military action against Afrin on the table for a while in order to prevent the formation of a Kurdish corridor in the north of Syria under the leadership of the PYD/YPG.

However, the current U.S. and Russian relations with the PYD/YPG make it difficult for Ankara to take the steps it wants.

It can actually be argued that Turkey and Iran, given their concurrent reaction to the KRG independence referendum, can possibly develop a similar attitude in regards to the PYD/YPG. The strong military support that Washington has been giving the PYD/YPG might also lead to a compromise between Ankara and Tehran.

However, we should also keep in mind that the Putin administration does not want to leave the PYD/YPG under an absolute U.S. control since it reckons that this PKK affiliate will become a major player in the future of Syria.

It is in fact claimed that the PYD/YPG may even get close to the Assad regime over time at Russia's encouragement. The fact that no major conflicts have taken place to date between the PYD/YPG and the regime forces may act as a catalyst that may facilitate such a process.

If that proves to be the case, Ankara may have great difficulty persuading Moscow of the urgency of an intervention against the PYD/YPG.

- Can Sochi produce a compromise?

One of the most important issues that will probably be brought up at the Sochi summit is the "Syrian National Dialogue Congress" initiative, which Russia had previously attempted to organize but had to postpone upon Turkey's reactions.

Ankara, in principle, is not opposed to the presence of Syrian Kurds in such a formation, but it unequivocally states that it will never accept the invitation of the PYD/YPG representatives to the congress.

Russia, on the other hand, does not recognize either the PKK or the PYD/YPG as a terrorist organization despite all the Turkish reactions. It is, in this sense, rather "meaningful" that the Moscow office of the PYD/YPG is still open.

It does not seem easy for Turkey and Russia to find a middle ground in terms of the PYD/YPG in the short run, particularly given the harsh reactions that Ankara gave to the Kurdish conference held in Russia at the beginning of this year and the notion of "cultural autonomy" found in Moscow's draft constitution for Syria.

But we should also remember that Russia needs Turkey's cooperation in regards to the de-escalation zones in Idlib and elsewhere. In addition, Moscow, in line with its own global strategy goals, welcomes Turkey's increasingly strained relations with NATO and the U.S due to its determination to buy the S-400 missile defense system as well as to a host of other problems.

As a result, the three countries -- Turkey, Iran and Russia --, which have been encountering problems with their relations with the West, might be aiming at delivering a message, particularly to the U.S., with the Sochi summit.

However, there are still considerable differences in their views regarding the settlement of the Syrian issue. Although it is not realistic to expect all these issues to be resolved in a short time, the fact that the three countries made a serious commitment to working together over the last year is an important development.

We can possibly argue that the decisions to be made at the Sochi summit will provide clues about the future of this cooperation.

Translated by Omer Colakoglu

* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.