Homegrown 5th-generation jet KAAN geopolitically critical for Türkiye

By Can Kasapoglu

The author, expert in military science and open source defense intelligence, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

ISTANBUL (AA) - Can Kasapoglu highlighted the importance of the homegrown fighter jet KAAN for the Turkish defense industry and explained how it will affect international competition.

Designed as a 5th generation tactical military aviation capability, KAAN is not only a defense industry milestone but also a geopolitically critical key. In the coming years, NATO's tactical military aviation capability will include 3rd and 5th generation fighter jets other than the F-22 and F-35, and this capability will be a Turkish platform.

- What kind of 5th-generation capability will KAAN offer?

Although it was not preferred in the first flying prototype, it was understood that KAAN had a remarkable sensor configuration from its images. It was seen that KAAN was equipped with separate IRST (infrared search and track) and EOTS (electro-optical targeting) systems. [1] It was emphasized previously that IRST systems would be resistant to radar-jamming electronic warfare threats thanks to their design and that they could overcome some low visibility features that deceive conventional sensors. Thus, the system may give KAAN an advantage over stealth aircraft. It was also noted that the separation of IRST and EOTS systems could provide serious advantages in terms of sensor configuration. KAAN showed the world that the program has reached an advanced stage by making its maiden flight.

- How will KAAN proceed?

Categorically, it is necessary to make two assessments - honest and assertive - about KAAN. Firstly, it is important to understand that KAAN is not the name of an aircraft but of a family. We will not only see the KAAN but also many variations of this family. Probably, when the first generation KAAN enters the inventory, it will demonstrate a combat performance above the 4.5th generation fighter jets. A new set of capabilities will be added to the Turkish Air Force and NATO allied military aviation capability. On the other hand, the first KAAN in the inventory will certainly have some handicaps when compared to the F-35 in terms of its 5th-generation profile. More advanced variants of the KAAN family will aim to close the gap.

Secondly, the plans for KAAN reveal that Türkiye will not be content with a classic 5th-generation perspective. Reports in the Turkish defense debate have openly voiced the idea that Baykar's Bayraktar Kizilelma and Turkish Aerospace Inc's (TAI) Anka-3 strategic armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) will conduct joint operations with KAAN. Technically, the concept has entered the literature as a "loyal wingman," and it has become a part of the 6th-generation tactical military aviation paradigm, such as the London-led Tempest Project. More specifically, Turkish defense planners have big ambitions for KAAN.

- International competition and KAAN

High-level capabilities such as KAAN are not only realized to shape the national inventory. Defense solutions in the upper segments are economic values with high political weight. KAAN should be approached from such a perspective. By the 2030s, the world will not have many options regarding the 5th-generation aircraft and the high-end 4.5th-generation intermediate solutions that can replace them. The F-35 is already a successful project in terms of market performance. Its sales in NATO inventories and beyond have exceeded expectations. To open a separate parenthesis, it is precisely for this reason that Türkiye's return to the F-35 project is more important for the Turkish defense industry than for the Turkish Air Force. It may sound good for KAAN to gain a share from markets that already have the F-35 in their air forces, but realistically, it is not easy. With the F-16V and F-35, for which Türkiye is advancing a new purchase package, Lockheed Martin's dominance in the international defense market will steadily increase in the coming years, especially in tactical military aviation solutions.

On the other hand, for countries that cannot access the F-35 due to political constraints or defense economics, KAAN will be an ideal alternative, as it will provide a capacity beyond the conventional 4.5th generation aircraft. In addition, KAAN will be a serious alternative for states that want to upgrade their Soviet-Russian inventories to NATO standards or are afraid of CAATSA sanctions.

KAAN is also a good chance among European NATO solutions. Looking at the fighter jet market of other NATO allies, Sweden's Gripen offers a low-cost 4.5th-generation solution but has not been able to stand out with its defense market success. Within the NATO alliance, Sweden is a limited, small Hungarian market. Outside NATO, Gripen's most notable success was its export to Brazil. The 4.5th-generation French Dassault Rafale is another NATO alternative solution to the US option, and its international margin is strong. In particular, failing the F-35 deal of the UAE due to its 5G deal with Huawei has opened a multi-billion dollar window of opportunity for the Dassault Rafale. On the other hand, the firm's industrial capacity has reached its limits due to the purchases of Indonesia, Greece, the UAE, Qatar, India and France, which is an important problem for the French. Open source data reveals that 238 platforms are waiting. [2] Ironically, the biggest obstacle to the export potential of the Franco-German 6th generation aviation project is Berlin. German defense export restrictions are likely to cause numerous problems for the French.

The project that we need to follow carefully for KAAN's market margin is South Korea's KAI KF-21 Borame solution. We will need to carefully monitor two main trends for Borame. The first of these is the interest of the NATO region in the project, especially through Poland, and the other is the reflex of the Gulf Arab arms market with its multi-billion dollar volume through Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is evaluated that three countries are currently interested in KAAN. These are Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Ukraine's ambassador to Ankara, Vasyl Bodnar - a highly experienced and career diplomat - has openly declared his country's interest in KAAN to the Turkish press. Of course, it should be noted that the Ukrainian defense industry has shown interest in KAAN's final engine.

Azerbaijan's transition to KAAN will have a serious meaning for Baku, which goes beyond the "one nation, two states" paradigm. The main fighter aircraft used by the Azerbaijani Air Force for fighter and multirole missions is the MiG-29. For political-military and geopolitical reasons, maintaining the aforementioned dependence on the Soviet-Russian system is not a wise choice. Baku has recently come to the fore with the JF-17, but this Chinese-backed Pakistani-made fighter jet is not in the same segment as the KAAN but rather a low-cost, advanced-generation solution. In the near future, KAAN will be the only tactical military aviation element in NATO standards for Azerbaijan. Of course, Islamabad is one of the most important arms markets in the world. KAAN's entry into this country will reveal another Turkish-Chinese defense rivalry, just like their rivalry in the Middle East drone market.

At the end of the analysis, it is necessary to draw attention to one point; we have mentioned topics such as the loyal wingman concept, sensor fusion and stealth aircraft geometry, and the competition for 4th, 4.5th and 5th generation military aviation solutions. In summary, this will be the most critical feature of KAAN. The fighter jet, which is the subject of the review, is the candidate to move Türkiye to a different technological and geopolitical agenda. Türkiye will now be a member of a club that produces 5th-generation military aviation capabilities within the NATO alliance.

[1] Joseph Trevithick, “Unique Sensor Setup Emerges On Turkey’s Stealthy New Fighter”, TWZ, January 2023.

[2] Douglas Barrie, “Dassault’s Whirlwind Of Rafale Orders May Be Too Much Of A Good Thing”, IISS, January 2024.

* Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu